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Challenges in the Interpretation
and Application of the Principle
of Distinction During Ground
Operations in Urban Areas
Colonel Noam Neuman*
ABSTRACT
This Article focuses on the tension between the often-referred-to
articulation of the principle of distinction, as reflected in
Additional Protocol I, and four practices that have been
continuously employed in ground operations by most if not all of
the world's militaries: masking, firing warning shots, breaching
structures, and maneuvering with heavy machinery. These
practices may very well result in incidental harm to civilians or
incidental damage to civilian objects, yet they are either directed at
an object that is not necessarily a military objective or they are not
directed at any object or person at all. In light of the sheer
universality of these practices for many decades-both before and
after the conclusion of Additional Protocol I-this Article proposes
four preliminary lines of thought that may help in gaining a better
understanding of Additional Protocol I's provisions as well as their
application in ground operations.
* Immediate Past Head, International Law Department, Military Advocate
General's Corps, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) (2011-2017). LLB, Bar Ilan University,
Israel; MA, Philosophy, Bar I1an University,,Israel; LLM, U.S. Judge Advocate General
Legal Center and School, Charlottesville, Virginia; MA, Political Science, Haifa
University, Israel; Graduate, IDF Command and Staff College and Israel National
Defense College. This Article is based on remarks delivered at the 11th Annual
Minerva/ICRC International Conference on International Humanitarian Law in
November 2016 and the 2nd IDF International Conference on the Law of Armed
Conflict, held in April 2017. The opinions and conclusions in this Article do not
necessarily represent the views of the IDF or the Government of Israel. Many thanks to
Guy Keinan and Ben Wahlhaus for their comments and suggestions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When we talk about military operations and the Law of Armed
Conflict (LOAC)-also known as International Humanitarian Law
(IHL)-we usually think about targeting, and what we normally have
in mind during such discussions are aerial attacks. We put much less
focus on ground maneuvers and the methods they involve, although
they raise some very interesting legal issues. This is understandable,
because the revolution in military affairs,' together with the
increased use of platforms such as drones and "smart" precision
weapons,2 has led to a major change in the nature of warfare: a
modern Western military can nowadays do much of the fighting from
afar.
One notable result of this state of affairs has been a change in
the focus of international lawyers-the law of targeting has become
the main area of interest for scholars and practitioners alike, and
questions such as "What is a military objective?"; "What is direct
participation in hostilities?"; "What precautions can feasibly be taken
1. See, e.g., Michael J. Mazarr, THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS: A
FRAMEWORK FOR DEFENSE PLANNING (June 10, 1994); Andrew Latham, Warfare
Transformed: A Braudelian Perspective on the "Revolution in Military Affairs", 8 EUR.
J. INT'L REL. 231, 231 (2002).
2. For a description of the nature of precision attack-including precision
technologies and the combat environment in which it occurs-and the relationship
between precision attack and international humanitarian law, see, for example,
Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 445 (2005).
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before striking a target?"; and "How do we apply the rule of
proportionality when conducting attacks?" have largely come to
occupy LOAC discourse.
However, ground operations in urban areas, especially when
conducted in high-intensity conditions3  (hereinafter Urban
Operations), are becoming increasingly common again for states
around the world, and especially so for those fighting in places like
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, Afghanistan, Georgia, and across Africa.4
It is therefore important to revive, revisit, and expand the discussions
concerning Urban Operations and the legal challenges they raise.
Urban Operations are certainly different than other types of
operations. They require soldiers to maneuver slowly and gradually,
relying first and foremost on rifles, grenades, tanks, and artillery. If
the maneuvering takes place (as it often does) in areas still controlled
by the adversary, those who are maneuvering generally face a
significant operational disadvantage: ambushes in close-quarter
combat, snipers, booby traps, antitank missiles, explosive ordnances,
and a significantly enhanced "fog of war" are just a few of the
challenges they must struggle with.5 Most importantly for lawyers,
however, these kinds of operations raise some intriguing questions
about the way we understand some of the most basic rules of LOAC.
This Article, based on presentations given at the 11th Annual
Minerva/ICRC International Conference on International
Humanitarian Law in November 2016, and the 2nd IDF International
Conference on LOAC in April 2017, focuses on the application of the
principle of distinction. To this end, Part II begins by outlining four
examples of military practices common to militaries around the world
that are considered essential in Urban Operations: masking, firing
warning shots, breaching structures, and maneuvering with heavy
3. For the definition of the term "ground operations in urban terrain which
are conducted under high-intensity conditions," see U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 3-
06.11 (FM 90-10-1), COMBINED ARMs OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN 1-3 (2002)
[hereinafter FM 3-06.11] ("These conditions include combat actions against a
determined enemy occupying prepared positions or conducting planned attacks. UO
[Urban Operations] under high-intensity conditions require the coordinated application
of the full combat power of the joint combined arms team. Infantry units must be
prepared at all times to conduct violent combat under conditions of high-intensity UO .
4. See, e.g., LOUIs A. DIMARCO, CONCRETE HELL: URBAN WARFARE FROM
STALINGRAD TO IRAQ (2012). In this book, DiMarco surveys historical trends in urban
combat since World War II, providing insights into the nature of urban combat from
tactical, operational, and strategic viewpoints.
5. For a description of Urban Operations and their characteristics, see
generally FM 3-06.11, supra note 3; see also U.S. MARINE CORPS, MCRP 12-10B.1
(formerly MCWP 3-35.3), MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBANIZED TERRAIN (2016)
[hereinafter MCRP 12-10B. 1]; JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-06, JOINT URBAN
OPERATIONS (Nov. 20, 2013) [hereinafter JOINT PUB. 3-06]; U.S. ARMY WAR COLL.,
SOLDIERS IN CITIES: MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBAN TERRAIN (Michael C. Dersch, ed.,
2001).
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machinery.6 A common feature of all these practices is that their
objective is not the destruction of an object or the killing of a person
but the achievement of a specific military benefit as an integral part
of carrying out the military mission (be it conquering a certain
territory, clearing an area of enemy forces, or simply advancing
forward). Another common feature of these practices-especially
crucial for lawyers-is that they often involve some damage or harm
to objects or persons that are not necessarily lawful targets.
Part III then surveys the legal questions raised by the four
practices and considers them through several prisms: the meaning of
"attack" under LOAC; the notion of "military objective"; the
prohibition on indiscriminate attacks; and the prohibition on
destroying the enemy's property unless imperatively demanded by
the necessities of war. The analysis in this Part uses Additional
6. Although these practices are common during ground operations in virtually
all militaries, the vast majority of militaries have not released their doctrine, manuals
and standard operating procedures (SOP) due to classification concerns. Accordingly,
providing references for these practices and their rationale is subject to what little
public information there is. Unclassified publications of the US military, regularly
referred to throughout this article, served especially useful in this regard. In addition,
videos of military exercises and trainings published on the internet provide a glimpse
into the doctrines of many militaries around the world when conducting operations in
urban terrain. See, e.g., AirSource Military, Army Soldiers Breach Buildings, YOUTUBE
(Aug. 25, 2014), http://youtu.be/ffYO6o2P5Q [https://perma.cc/U3RF-PNHS] (archived
Feb. 4, 2018); Artuz Sheva TV, IDF Paratroopers Train Urban Warfare, YOUTUBE (Jul.
14, 2014), http://youtu.be/-XXa2S6BRNI [https://perma.ccU7F5-WCE6] (archived Feb.
4, 2018); Cody Bowman, Combat Engineer Urban Breaching Germany, YoUTUBE (Oct.
8, 2015), https://youtu.be/BQ4ulNyivDI [https://perma.cc/Q6ME-C5P2] (archived Feb.
4, 2018); Daily Military Defense & Archive, US and Canadian Soldiers Breaching Door
with Shotguns, YOUTUBE (July 24, 2015), https://youtu.be/Pmt8NyvJgY
[https://perma.cc/N5QE-4RDQ] (archived Feb. 4, 2018); Martin Digranes, The
Norwegian Army: Urban Warfare Training, YOUTUBE (Apr. 7, 2014),
http://youtu.be/Xvez5IDiOw8 [https://perma.cclH65M-88MW] (archived Feb. 4, 2018);
Forces TV, British Army Preparing for Future Urban Conflict, YOUTUBE (Mar. 15,
2016), http://youtu.be/TORYz-GxU8c [https://perma.cc/DNK5-LG3K] (archived Feb. 4,
2018); Foxtrot Alpha, British Army Training at Trident Juncture 2015, YOUTUBE (Nov.
24, 2015), https://youtu.be/5dHdEXGHAXQ [https://perma.cc/X5LW-AY22] (archived
Feb. 4, 2018); Military Videos Daily, U.S. Marines Mobility and Assault Company
Conduct Urban Demolition Breach Training, YOUTUBE (May 23, 2016),
https://youtu.be/AufywNkuSql [https://perma.cc/8FU7-JZVC] (archived Feb. 4, 2018);
NATO Prepares for Urban War, YOUTUBE (May 27, 2007),
https://youtu.be/GTvQmltSO-k [https://perma.cc/UXC8-37V4] (archived Feb. 4, 2018)
(original broadcast by CBS Newsworld); nbakewell06, USMC Urban Breaching Water
Charge, YouTUBE (July 10, 2011), http://youtu.be/Bw6EH95htYg
[https://perma.cc/3SNJ-ZG4T] (archived Feb. 4, 2018); nbakewell06, USMC Oval
Charge Wall Breach, YOUTUBE (July 8, 2011), https://youtu.be/slTVRfrPJzo
[https://perma.cc/L3DS-9VKG] (archived Feb. 4, 2018); WarLeaks, US Marines Japan
Self Defence Forces & Australian Army in Heavy Intense Urban Combat Action
Training, YOUTUBE (Aug. 9, 2016), http://youtu.be/mV_17SUrtjO
[https://perma.cc/E26S-VWJH] (archived Feb. 4, 2018); WarLeaks, US Marines &
French Army Use Famas Assault Rifles in Heavy Urban Combat Firefight Simulation,
YOUTUBE (Aug. 6, 2016), http://youtu.be/-aVNTPTeU1A [https://perma.cc/RDN7-8RCJ]
(archived Feb. 4, 2018).
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Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions7 (hereinafter Additional
Protocol I, or API) as a point of reference. As is well known, not all
countries are parties to API,8 and there is significant disagreement
regarding the customary nature of some of its provisions.9
Nevertheless, as the majority of states in the world are party to API,
and since its provisions regarding the principle of distinction are
often referred to, one should strive to reconcile these provisions with
common practices that have been and are still being employed by
militaries around the world. Accordingly, Part III proceeds under the
assumption that practices which have been universally employed
before, during, and after the negotiation of API cannot be unlawful as
a matter of customary international law, since custom can only
emerge following the accumulation of general practice and opino
juris.'0 Part IV concludes.
II. OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES AND COMMON PRACTICES IN URBAN
OPERATIONS
More than 2,500 years ago, the famous Chinese general Sun Tzu
declared that "the worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only
when there is no alternative."" The same advice is reflected in the
doctrine of numerous armies and in the theories of military
7. See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12,
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol 1].
8. The United States and Israel, for example, are not among the 174 state
parties to Additional Protocol I. Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, INT'L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icre.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp
viewStates=Xpages_ NORMStatesParties&xp-treatySelected=470 (last visited Feb. 23,
2018) [https:/perma.cclRNZ9-VH5K] (archived Feb. 4, 2018).
9. The United States, for instance, recognizes only certain aspects of
Additional Protocol I as indicative of customary international law. See Martin D.
Dupuis et al., The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law
Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary
International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 415, 419-431 (1987); see generally George H. Aldrich,
Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1991).
10. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice defines
custom as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law". See Statute of the
International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993
(entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). It is of course hypothetically possible that API differs
from customary international law in this regard and sets additional requirements that
parties to API must adhere to. Such an argument, however, would lead to the
conclusion that most if not all parties to API-comprising most of the world's states-
are continuously in violation of API's "version" of distinction. For sake of brevity, this
article leaves this question open and does not address it.
11. SUN TzU, THE ART OF WAR 78 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., N.Y., Oxford
Univ. Press 1982) (n.p., n.d.)
2018] 811
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
strategists.1 2 The reason is obvious: the urban battlefield generally
consists of man-made constructions intertwined with a high
population density, which gives the defending force-that is well-
acquainted with the area and able to thoroughly prepare for the
arrival of the attacking force-a decisive military advantage.13
Buildings, for example, can provide cover and concealment, limit
the fields of observation and fire, and make it harder for the
attacking force to utilize mechanized or armored forces. Fighting in
the urban terrain also means that there are multiple surface areas
from which the enemy may direct attacks: for the infantry soldier
moving through an urban neighborhood, adversaries may attack from
within and from on top of buildings, as well as from subterranean
positions.14 Urban infrastructure, moreover, allows the defending
forces to predict, or even intentionally channel, the movement of
advancing forces, since the options for movement may be restricted to
pre-existing roads and other routes. For instance, adversaries may
lay mines, improvised explosive devices, and other explosives, as well
as prepare ambushes, on the expected routes of travel. Additionally,
conventional air-strikes, close-air support, and the use of certain
weapons are of limited effectiveness in Urban Operations.'5 It is
12. See, e.g., ScoTT GERWEHR & RUSSELL W. GLENN, THE ART OF DARKNESS:
DECEPTION AND URBAN OPERATIONS 10 (2000) ("U.S. Army doctrine has heretofore
advocated avoiding operations in urban terrain when possible, reflecting an awareness
of the challenges posed by such an environment."); Alexandre Vautravers, Military
Operations in Urban Areas, 92 INT. REV. RED CROSS 437 (2010). ("Throughout history,
armies have been reluctant to fight in cities and conduct siege operations. Fighting in
such conditions is generally devastating and costly."); George J. Mordica II, It's a Dirty
Business, but Somebody Has to Do It, CALL NEWSLETTER No. 99-16, Nov. 23, 1999,
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1999/99-16/chap l.htm
[https://perma.cc/4GK4-C6BY] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
13. One important lesson learned by the Soviet Union from the World War II
experience, for example, was that urban warfare heavily favors the defense-Soviet
tacticians argued that to capture and hold a city, the attacker requires an advantage in
terms of number of forces of at least 4:1 (some said 6:1). See, e.g., OLGA OLIKER,
RuSSIA'S CHECHEN WARS 1994-2000: LESSONS FROM URBAN COMBAT 6 (2001). In
reality, at the battle against ISIS to liberate Mosul, it has taken 100,000 Iraqi forces
(including the Kurdish peshmerga soldiery) almost a year to kill or drive out from
Mosul the estimated 5,000 ISIS operatives. See Bing West, Urban Warfare, Then and
Now, THE ATLANTIC (June 30, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/internationall
archive/2017/06/urban-warfare-hue-mosul/532173/ [https://perma.cc/384S-9XM4]
(archived Feb. 5, 2018).
14. A recent example of using subterranean tactics may be found in the 2014
conflict between the IDF and Hamas and other armed groups in Gaza. See STATE OF
ISRAEL, THE 2014 GAZA CONFLICT: FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 40-45 (2014)
[hereinafter 2014 GAZA CONFLICT]; see also RAPHAEL S. COHEN ET AL., FROM CAST LEAD
TO PROTECTIVE EDGE: LESSONS FROM ISRAEL'S WARS IN GAZA (2017). For an analysis of
the motivations behind Hamas's decision to construct the tunnels network and the
level of its effectiveness both strategically and tactically, see, for example, Nicole J.
Watkins & Alena M. James, Digging into Israel: The Sophisticated Tunneling Network
of Hamas, 9 J. STRATEGIC SEC. 84 (2016).
15. See, e.g., Doug Richardson & Linda Richardson, The Vertical Battlefield, 29
ARMADA INT'L 1 (2005) ("Conventional air strikes are of limited effectiveness in cities,
812 [VOL. 51:807
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therefore not surprising that Urban Operations regularly involve
higher casualty rates to the attacking force,16 heavy damage to the
surroundings,1 7 and high civilian casualties.1 8
Despite entreaties to avoid Urban Operations, it appears that
the number of armed conflicts being fought in urban terrain is on the
partly because of the greater risks of collateral damage and partly because of terrain
features. Urban canyons reduce the ability of aircraft to maneuver, and so make them
more vulnerable to attack by air defence artillery and missiles hidden on high
buildings. The combination of high-rise buildings and low cloud further reduces the
effective above ground level (AGL) operating area, while aircraft silhouetted against
overcast skies are easy targets . . . Tanks, artillery and missile batteries are at a
similar disadvantage, designed for firing at targets at a distance and on the flat.
Closely packed buildings deny conventional weapons adequate range and lines of sight,
while limits on gun elevation and depression create areas that are safe from fire - for
instance in basements and in tall buildings. Other disadvantages are subtler. Night
vision goggles and thermal sights may be dazzled by city lights, fires and background
illumination. Reduction in visibility can similarly degrade the
performance of weapons sensors and laser- or optically-guided weapons."); see also
RUSSELL W. GLENN, COMBAT IN HELL: A CONSIDERATION OF CONSTRAINED URBAN
WARFARE 10 (1996) ("A weapon may have a minimum arming distance too great for
close targets. Some systems also have 'dead space' . . . Height and proximity of
buildings cause further dead space problems . . . Building can similarly interfere with
aircraft engagements . . . Terrain characteristics not only tend to neutralize firepower
advantages; they also increase the probability of inadvertent noncombatant casualties
due to munitions impacts on other than-intended targets."); 2014 GAZA CONFLICT,
supra note 14, at 150-55.
16. A contemporary example can be found at the battle against ISIS to liberate
Mosul. Six months into this operation, the head of U.S. Central Command, Lt. Gen.
Joseph Votel said: "[T]his is the most significant urban combat to take place since
World War II . . . It is tough and brutal"; adding that until then 774 Iraqi troops were
killed, and 4,600 wounded, highlighting the difficulty of fighting in a densely populated
city where the militants have had several years to build up complex defenses. See Jim
Michaels, Iraqi forces in Mosul see deadliest urban combat since World War II, USA
TODAY (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/03/29/united-
states-mosul-isis-deadly-combat-world-war-iil99787764/ [https://perma.cclQ53W-
UQVP] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
17. In the battles of United States in Al-Fallujah Iraq (2004), for example,
experts estimate that although the US forces had specific intelligence about insurgent
locations inside the city and took several steps to spare civilians and civilian objectives
(including canceling the majority of the preplanned attack due to concern for civilian
casualties and using mainly precision missiles), the city suffered heavy damage to its
infrastructures. According to one source, between seven thousand and ten thousand of
the city's 39,000 buildings were destroyed; while according to another source, of the
roughly 50,000 buildings in Al-Fallujah, only about half still stand after the battle. See
William Head, The Battles of Al-Fallujah: Urban Warfare and the Growth of Air Power,
60 AIR POWER HIST. 32, 47 (2003); Colin H. Kahl, How We Fight, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 83,
93 (2006).
18. In the nine-month battle against ISIS to liberate Mosul, for example,
intelligence reports estimate that more than 40,000 civilians were killed. See Patrick
Cockburn, The massacre of Mosul: 40,000 feared dead in battle to take back city from
ISIS as scale of civilian casualties revealed, INDEPENDENT (July 19, 2017),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/mosul-massacre-battle-isis-iraq-
city-civilian-casualties-killed-deaths-fighting-forces-islamic-state-a7848781.html
[https://perma.ccl7QA2-E7RH] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
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rise 9 and that armies are increasing their preparation and training
for such fights.20 Furthermore, several researchers have concluded
that current military doctrines are simply insufficient for dealing
with current Urban OperationS2 1 and have recommended developing
new doctrines and capabilities for dealing with their varying
conditions.22 Consequently, it is becoming exceedingly crucial to
19. The main reason for this rise is that typical non-state actor adversaries
have become highly aware of the tactical and strategic advantages of drawing the
conflict into their urban centers in order, inter alia, to be able to counter the
adversary's military superiority including by creating the perception of violations of
international law-a practice termed "lawfare," or using the law as substitute for
traditional military means to achieve a war-fighting objective. See, e.g., Charles J.
Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today ... and Tomorrow, in 87 INT'L L. STUD. 315 (Raul A. "Pete"
Pedrozo & Daria P. Wollschlaeger eds., 2011); Laurie R. Blank, Lawfare and The
Israeli-Palestine Predicament: Finding Facts but Missing the Law, 43 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 279 (2010); Richard D. Rosen, Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Terror:
Preserving Civilian Immunity, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 683 (2009) (describing the
way terrorist and insurgent groups gain strategic and tactical advantages through
their own noncompliance with the law and their adversaries' observance of it). This
practice was evidenced, for example, by the tactics of ISIS in Iraq, as well as in a
Hamas urban combat manual and training aid recovered by IDF forces during the 2014
Gaza Conflict. See 2014 GAZA CONFLICT, supra note 14, at 152-54.
20. See, e.g., Raul Dancel, Singapore offers drones, urban warfare training
ground, aid to help Philippines fight militants in Marawi, STRAITS TIMES (July 19,
2017), http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/singapore-offers-saf-assistance-to-
philippines-in-fight-against-terrorism [https://perma.c/N2ZP-Q9QQ] (archived Feb. 5,
2018); Ellis Grp., 21st Century Urban Operations: Infrastructure Impact on Military
Operations, 100 MARINE CORPS GAZETTE 21 (2016) ("The traditional view of bypassing
and isolating urban areas is no longer a viable course of action because the urban areas
are where the problems lie . . . If we espouse the Marine Corps as a 'crisis response
force,' we must recognize that we will be most likely employed in the urban littorals
because that is where the root (people and issues) of the crisis lies."); Walter F. Ullrich,
The German Army and Urban Operations, MILITARY SIMULATION & TRAINING MAG.
(Feb. 10, 2015), https://militarysimulation.training/land/german-army-urban-
operations [https://perma.cc/Q5VL-JXLX] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
21. A study conducted in 1996 by Russell Glenn from RAND cooperation, for
example, concludes that current United States army doctrine is not sufficient for
fighting in build-up areas and as a result it will consume any force that fights
unprepared. Therefore, he suggests several recommendations and potential remedies
for identified vulnerabilities. See GLENN, supra note 15. Additionally, in 2003 a NATO
study group concluded that although it is likely that NATO forces in 2020 will have to
conduct Urban Operations, present NATO capabilities for operating in urban areas are
essentially those of World War II; therefore, it is essential to develop a range of
capabilities for dealing with the varying conditions of operations in urban areas. See
RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANIZATION, URBAN OPERATIONS IN THE YEAR 2020
(2003) [hereinafter NATO RTO]; see also, Ellis Grp., supra note 20 ("To be successful,
we need to change our view of the urban littorals and how approach it. It is not two
separate things to be tackled in isolation. It must be viewed as a whole, and we must
start preparing ourselves to deal with the entire problem.").
22. See, e.g., Robert F. Hahn II & Bonnie Jezior, Urban Warfare and the Urban
Warfighter of 2025, 29 PARAMETERS 74 (1999); Jason Sherman, Advisory panel calls for
new army capabilities, inventory retrofit for future fight in megacities, SITREP (Nov.
12, 2017), https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/advisory-panel-calls-new-army-
capabilities-inventory-retrofit-future-fight-megacities [https://perma.ccLZ32-QVTU]
(archived Feb. 5, 2018) ("[T]he Army needs to take action to bolster capabilities to fight
814 [voL. 51:807
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discuss the legal aspects involving such operations in order to aid in
finding solutions to current challenges in accordance with the LOAC.
As a way of exemplifying these challenges, four military practices
prevalent in Urban Operations will now be discussed.
A. Masking
Throughout history, militaries have used masking tactics to
confuse and deceive their enemies,2 3 providing commanders with
additional means to meet the imperatives of the battle. Such tactics
were used to degrade the enemy's ability to identify the movement of
forces, conceal friendly forces, deceive the enemy into thinking forces
were in a different location, and degrade or outright defeat infrared
and laser systems used to designate targets or identify tanks.24
The use of masking tactics is especially crucial during Urban
Operations, when there is no alternative but to cross "kill zones,"
such as streets, alleys, and parks, which are natural spaces to be
exploited by the enemy. In such cases, the area must be crossed as
quickly as possible, usually only after specific actions have been
applied, including deploying smoke screens from hand grenades or
from shells fired from mortars or artillery platforms.25
While masking means are not typically directed at civilians or
civilian structures, using them in urban terrain likely entails some
damage to the surroundings or to persons in the area. While effects
vary in accordance with the weapon and munitions used, it is
common for them to cause some harm to nearby persons, as a result
of their kinetic effects; to cause illness or temporary difficulties with
breathing, especially if the person exposed to the smoke is near the
source of emission or if the smoke penetrates relatively closed
structures; and even to produce embers or ash that may cause burns
in megacities and should lobby Pentagon leaders to adopt defense planning scenarios
that include dense-urban area operations as an initial step toward laying the
groundwork for potential weapon system programs needed for these missions"); NATO
RTO supra note 21.
23. For a historical perspective from as early as 2000 B.C., see U.S. DEP'T OF
THE ARMY FM 3-50, SMOKE OPERATIONS 5-6 (1990) [hereinafter FM 3-50].
24. See, e.g., id. at 9-10; NATO RTO, supra note 21, at D-21 ("Counter-
measures may include . . . multi-spectral screening smoke to prevent laser and/or
electro-optical target designation .... .").
25. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 3-21.75 (FM 21-75), THE WARRIOR
ETHOS AND SOLDIER COMBAT SKILLS 8-1 (2008) [hereinafter FM 3-21.75] ("Open areas.
. . should be avoided. They are natural kill zones for enemy, crew-served weapons, or
snipers. They can be crossed safely if the individual applies certain fundamentals,
including using smoke from hand grenades or smoke pots to conceal movement."); see
also FM 3-06.11, supra note 3, at 3-1 ("Smoke, suppressive fires, and cover and
concealment should be used to hide movement."); MCRP 12-10B.A, supra note 5, at 2-
17, 2-21 ("Tank and AAV generated smoke may be useful in concealing the location and
movement of assaulting forces . . . When attacking in unrestricted visibility, units
should use smoke to conceal movement.").
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upon contact. Masking therefore is an activity that may cause
damage to objects or persons not defined as lawful targets.
B. Firing Warning Shots
Warning shots are shots fired with the intent of warning
someone of a future action and bringing them to act in a certain way,
without directly harming them.2 6 In Urban Operations, the use of
warning shots can be instrumental in saving civilian lives.2 7
A common scenario where warning shots are employed is one
where a military force has established a roadblock in a city in order to
control unidentified traffic, and an unknown vehicle is speeding in
the direction of the force. If a soldier manning the roadblock is not
reasonably certain that the approaching vehicle is a suicide car
bomb,2 8 he or she might fire a warning shot to the side of the vehicle,
into the road and then towards the front of the car, as part of a
possible escalation procedure in the applicable rules of engagement,
with the intention of causing the vehicle to slow down, turn around,
or stop.
Warning shots may also be fired in a final attempt, following
previous verbal warnings, to cause civilians to evacuate in
anticipation of an impending attack in their vicinity. For example,
advancing forces may want to enter a civilian compound in order to
capture a militant or neutralize a military target located within it,
and despite numerous verbal warnings provided to the inhabitants of
26. See, e.g., INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN L., RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
HANDBOOK 35 (2009).
27. Lieutenant General Mark Evans, who served in the Australian Army
as Chief of Joint Operations from 2008 to 2011, explains that because of the difficulty
of identifying the combatants within the civilian population in military operations
conducted in densely populated areas, it is important to use warning shots since "too
many non-combatants who moved around the operational area in Iraq and Afghanistan
were shot because they failed to heed or understand warnings. In these instances,
warning shots would have perhaps provided them with a moment for comprehension."
See Mark Evans, The Challenges ofMilitary Operations in Densely Populated Areas: An
Australian Perspective, 5 MILITARY & STRATEGIC AFF. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 89 (2014). For
an explanation how warning shots were also part of a technique called escalation of
force used in Iraq by the United States Army whose aim was to help preventing civilian
casualties while still providing security for the forces, see Adam J. Tiffen, How The
Rules Of Engagement Save Lives In Combat, TASK & PURPOSE (Aug. 22, 2014)
http://taskandpurpose.com/rules-engagement-save-lives-combat/
[https://perma.cc/873S-3Z6V] (archived Feb. 5, 2018).
28. The use of suicide vehicles has become common in some Urban Operations,
including the campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. See, e.g., Mark Thompson, The
Fight for Mosul: Kamikaze 2.0, TIME (Oct 19, 2016), http://time.com/4535914/mosul-
iraq-suicide-video/ [https://perma.cc/ZW2K-W46D] (archived Feb. 5, 2018) ("Two of
every three ['martyrdom operations' in Iraq, Libya and Syria] involved car bombs, as
opposed to individuals wearing explosive belts or vests. There's military logic to ISIS
suicide bombers' choice of what in military lingo is called the "platform" to deliver
death: vehicles are faster and can carry more explosives.").
816 [VOL 51:807
PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION DURING GROUND OPERATIONS IN URBAN AREAS
this civilian compound, they have not evacuated. Intelligence
estimations indicate that the inhabitants may be under the false
impression that the advancing forces do not actually intend to enter
the compound and that no fighting will actually take place. After
exhausting all those avenues, in an effort to encourage evacuation
without causing substantial harm to people or property, the
commander may consider firing a very small explosive into an open
area adjacent to the compound, or even firing towards an external
wall surrounding the compound in a way that would not penetrate
any structures.
In these examples and others, warning shots might eventually be
directed at an object that has not yet been determined a lawful target.
C. Breaching Structures
Wall or door breaching2 9 is a very common combat task in urban
areas3 0 and is employed for three main purposes: First, gaining quick
entry to a building in order to quickly overwhelm and subdue any
enemy forces within the structure before they can mount resistance.3 1
Second, moving between buildings through the walls while avoiding
using existing doors or windows due to concerns about booby traps
and ambushes, as well as to avoid having to move through exposed
areas external to the buildings.3 2 And finally, creating loopholes for
29. This is also referred to as "tactical breaching," as opposed to the more
general term "breaching", which may refer to a larger military operation designed to
breach an adversary's defenses. For an explanation of such tactical breaching, see
Stephen Kalin, Iraqi army learns Ramadi's lessons in U.S.-led coalition training,
REUTERS (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-
training/iraqi-army-learns-ramadis-lessons-in-u-s-led-coalition-training-
idUSKCNOV61C3 [https://perma.cclXBF2-4P9V] (archived Feb. 4, 2018) (explaining
how such tactical breaching was taught in 2016 by the U.S.-led coalition forces to the
Iraqi forces, based on the lessons they have learned from the challenges in Ramadi,
Tikrit, Sinjar and Baiji).
30. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 3-34.2 (FM 90-13-1), COMBINED-
ARMS BREACHING OPERATIONS (2002).
31. See, e.g., FM 3-21.75, supra note 25, at 8-8 ("Blow or cut breach holes
through walls to allow you to enter a building. Such entrances are safer than doors,
because doors are easily booby trapped, and should be avoided, unless you conduct an
explosive breach on the door."); FM 3-06.11, supra note 3, at 3-19 ("Breachholes and
mouseholes are blown or cut through a wall so soldiers can enter a building . .. These
are safer entrances than doors . . . .")
32. See, e.g., High-Intensity Urban Combat Tactics, SPECIAL TACTICS,
https://specialtactics.methome/2017/7/23/high-intensity-urban-combat-tactics-xbe8n-
n3ra7 (last visited Feb. 23, 2018) [https://perma.cc/M92N-Q2QC] (archived Feb. 4,
2018) ("Both sides will also avoid using doors if possible and instead use explosives,
heavy shells or armored vehicles to 'mouse-hole' through walls. Military units might
want to study World War II battles to relearn many 'dirty tricks' of urban combat that
have not been used for decades."); NATO RTO, supra note 21, at iii ("The Study Group
then identified an emerging overarching approach to urban operations that holds the
promise of leading to significantly improved capabilities. The more traditional
approaches to improving urban capabilities are focused at the tactical, single-Service
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weapons positions or for allowing hand grenades to be thrown into
defended structures.3 3
For example, a military force operating in an urban area will
often need to enter a house in order to execute a military mission, and
they might use explosive, ballistic, thermal, or mechanical methods in
order to quickly open the door and enter the house. Likewise, a
soldier might create loopholes in a house, causing damage to it in the
process, in order to create a weapons position.
In many cases, such breaching techniques are directed at an
object that has not been positively identified as a military objective
under the LOAC. Oftentimes, no information exists about the house
that would allow for defining it as a "military objective."
Nevertheless, and although they are frequently applied against
civilian objects per se, breaching tactics appear in countless military
doctrines as an important and integral part of urban warfare, and
they have been3 4 and are being35 used on a constant basis.
D. Maneuvering with Heavy Machinery
One cannot move an armed force through an urban area-no
matter the size of the force-without causing some damage to the
surroundings. This is especially the case when infantry soldiers are
maneuvering through and within the urban terrain while using
heavy machinery.
When tanks move through a neighborhood, for example, they are
likely to cause damage to the roads due to their weight and may even
render them unsuitable for ordinary use. Moreover, when a tank
maneuvers through a narrow street or close to walls-as occasionally
it must do, in order to be protected from enemy antitank missiles-it
level. These ait to help tactical forces better cope with the conditions of uncertainty,
close proximity to the enemy and vulnerability that characterise tactical engagements.
Initiatives include improved personal protection, wall breaching techniques, etc.").
33. Although windows might be good fighting positions, sometimes there is a
military necessity to create a hole in the wall for weapons positions (especially machine
guns), or to allow hand grenades to be thrown into defended structures. The position
regularly needs to be camouflaged, by knocking other holes in the wall, making it
difficult for the enemy to determine which hole the fire is coming from. See, e.g., FM 3-
06.11 supra note 3, at 3-47 to 3-49, 3-52, 7-15 to 7-16.
34. In September 1944, for example, intensive urban combat took place
between German and Allied forces, during which attackers moved from house to house
by blowing holes in the walls (internal and external) and ceilings so that the advancing
infantrymen would not have to expose themselves to enemy fire in the streets. See
ALFRED M. BECK ET AL., THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 384-
85 (1985).
35. For interesting demonstrations how such breaching tactics are being
implemented during trainings in the U.S. Marines Corps, see, for example, III MEF
Marines, How to Breach Like a Marine, YOUTUBE (July 7, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-3r0JBCVsBIO [https://perma.cc/3UNB-J54Z]
(archived Feb. 19, 2018); Bridget Bosch, Breaching and Entering, YOUTUBE (Apr. 12,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-gHvPEQMukpk [https://perma.cc/CX57-
2XQN] (archived Feb. 19, 2018).
818 [VOL. 51:807
PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION DURING GROUND OPERATIONS IN URBAN AREAS
will probably cause substantial damage along the way, such as by
scraping walls and breaking windows. In such cases, the heavy
machinery used is not "directed" at anything, but some damage is
caused by maneuvering and advancing through the urban terrain.
III. LEGAL QUESTIONS AND CHALLENGES
The four practices surveyed have several common
characteristics:
(1) they are conventional practices employed by militaries in
their attempt to accomplish the military mission;
(2) they are not "directed" at any specific object, or are directed
at an object that is not necessarily a "military objective"; and
(3) they may very well result in incidental harm or damage,
which cannot always be anticipated.
These features raise questions with respect to the principle of
distinction,36 which is one of the two "cardinal" principles of the
LOAC. 37 According to its often-referred-to articulation in API, this
principle strictly limits attacks to military objectives, prohibits
directing attacks against civilians or civilian objects,38 and proscribes
"indiscriminate attacks," which include attacks not directed at a
specific military objective or the employment of a method or means of
combat that cannot be directed at a specific military objective.39 The
tension between this articulation and the four practices surveyed is
readily apparent: although the practices may very well result in harm
or damage, which is sometimes incidental and sometimes deliberate,
they are either directed at an object that is not necessarily a military
objective or they are not directed at any object or person at all. Can
this tension be reconciled?
As already stated above, it is difficult to conclude that the four
practices are unlawful. They have been continuously employed for
36. This article considers only the principle of distinction and deliberately sets
aside other possible legal obligations under the LOAC. The ensuing analysis is based
on the assumption that such obligations have been satisfied in each and every case: all
feasible precautions have been taken, no proportionality concerns arise, all the
weapons employed are lawful, and so on.
37. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶¶ 78, 83 (July 8).
38. See, e.g., PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT
HARVARD UNIV., MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAw APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE
WARFARE 83-88 (2009) [hereinafter HPCR COMMENTARY]; TALLINN MANUAL ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 110-12 (Michael N. Schmitt ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].
39. The prohibition is based on Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I, which will
be discussed below in more detail. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 51(4).
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many decades by most if not all of the world's militaries-including
those of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Canada, Norway,
Israel, Japan, France, and Australia. This generality of practice does
not allow one to conclude that customary international law prohibits
employing these practices. Moreover, assuming, as one should, that
these militaries are law abiding, it seems reasonable to suggest that
they consider these practices to be in accordance with the LOAC.
Nevertheless, there seemingly remains some tension between these
practices and the often-referred-to articulation of distinction under
API.
As this issue is apparently vastly underexplored, it seems
premature to provide definitive answers. Four preliminary lines of
thought may nevertheless help better understand API's provisions in
this regard as well as their application during Urban Operations.
These lines of thought include: the notion of "attack"; the definition of
"military objectives"; the exact content of the prohibition against
indiscriminate attack; and the applicability of Article 23(g) of the
Hague Regulations.
A. The Notion of "Attack"
Article 52(2) of API stipulates that "attacks shall be limited
strictly to military objectives."40 The first relevant issue to be
explored, therefore, is the notion of "attack": if we determine no
attack has occurred, arguably there has been no violation of the
principle of distinction under API.
Article 49(1) of API defines "attacks" as "acts of violence against
the adversary, whether in offence or in defence."'" At first glance, it
seems that all four examples described above might be considered to
be attacks, since they involve "acts of violence" that are, arguably,
"against the adversary."
However, it could be argued that if the act is not expected to
cause actual harm to a person or an object, then no attack will have
occurred.42 According to this argument, firing warning shots into the
air, or even dropping a bomb in open terrain-which is expected to
cause no real damage except for moving sand from one place to
another-may not be considered an attack. Likewise, it would seem
that actions such as driving tanks through a narrow street are not
40. Id. art. 52(2).
41. Id. art. 49(1).
42. See, e.g., HPCR COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 114 (explaining both that
"[t]he application of the general Rules prohibiting attacks directed against civilians or
civilian objects, as well as indiscriminate attacks, is confined to air or missile attacks
that entail violent effects, namely, acts resulting in death, injury, damage or
destruction," and that "[d]espite the lack of direct authority for this Rule in treaty law,
the majority of the Group of Experts concluded that it generally reflects State
Practice.").
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"attacks" (even though they may cause harm or damage) but, at the
most, "military operations,"4 3 as they are not "acts of violence against
the adversary."44
Another possible argument in this regard might be that the term
"attack" has different meanings in different parts of API. According to
this interpretation, the main meaning is defined in Article 49(1) and
includes mainly, although not exclusively, attacks directed against
specific objects.4 5 However, there might be specific acts (like masking
tactics or firing warning shots), which would not be considered
"attacks" for the purpose of applying specific API's provisions,
although they might involve some kinds of use of force against the
adversary.46 Naturally, the acts that might not be considered
"attacks" for the purpose of applying the principle of distinction
should be carefully determined, taking into account, inter alia, state
practice and the object and purpose of API. 47
43. The UK Manual, for example, points out that the phrase "military
operation" has "a wider connotation than 'attack' and would include the movement or
deployment of armed forces." See U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 5.32, at 81 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL]. Likewise,
according to INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 at 670 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno
Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY], "[t]he term 'military
operations' should be understood to mean any movements, maneuvers and other
activities whatsoever carried out by the armed forces with a view to combat."
44. It is important to note that even if a specific practice-like driving tanks
through a narrow street-would not be considered an "attack," it might nevertheless be
regarded as an "operation" and therefore, under Article 48 of Additional Protocol I,
must still be directed only against military objectives. Additional Protocol I, supra note
7, art. 48. One possible solution might be the one adopted by the Tallinn Manual,
which concluded that "only when a cyber operation against civilians or civilian objects
(or other protected persons and objects) rises to the level of an attack is it prohibited by
the principle of distinction and those rules of the law of armed conflict that derive from
the principle." See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 38, at 112. In any case, it should be
noted that Article 48's reference to military operations is not free of problems and
probably does not reflect customary international law. Even the ICRC's study into
customary international humanitarian law, which tends to be quite inclusive and
expansive, has refrained from maintaining that operations-as opposed to attacks-
must be limited to military objectives. Accordingly, the ICRC's articulation of
distinction focuses on attacks. See generally 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE
DOSWALD-BECK, INTL COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
45. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 49(1).
46. William Fenrick, for example, claims that the term "attack" for the
purposes of Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(1) of Additional Protocol I should have
narrower meaning than it has in Article 49(1), since it would be "inappropriate and
impractical to classify an operation below divisional or equivalent level as an 'attack'
for the purpose of these articles." See William Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and
Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 102 (1982).
47. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23,
1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention], a treaty should be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning given to the term of the treaty in context, and in the light of its
object and purpose. Also, Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention provides that in the
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B. The Definition of "Military Objectives"
Assuming an action qualifies as an "attack," Article 52(2)
requires it to be "limited" strictly to "military objectives."4 8 What does
this mean with regard to the lawfulness of the tactics mentioned? Is it
really unlawful to use breaching tactics against objects that cannot be
clearly identified as "military objectives"? Is it actually a violation of
the LOAC to create a smoke screen by using masking shells-which
might cause harm to civilians-if the shells are simply thrown into
the street as part of the advancement of forces, and not directed
specifically against "military objectives"? Should militaries teach
their soldiers not to move by breaking through walls, when these
walls are not part of a structure which can be identified as a "military
objective"?
In certain situations, it might be reasonable to address this
problem by widening the definition of "military objectives," so that
some of the practices mentioned would be regarded as attacks against
"military objectives." Let us consider, for example, a scenario where,
in the context of an attack on a military compound of the enemy,
soldiers need to create a loophole in a wall so as to position their
weapon to carry out the attack. In such a case there might be a
reasonable argument that the wall where the hole is to be created is
in fact a "military objective," since by its location it makes an effective
contribution to military action (in this case, facilitating an attack
against the enemy) and, in the circumstances ruling at the time, the
action would offer a definite military advantage. Similarly, we might
consider the possibility to define an area in which there is a definite
military advantage in creating a smoke screen as a "military
objective" by location. If it is lawful to use barrage fire in order to
prevent the enemy from establishing itself in a particular area, as the
ICRC has suggested,4 9 would it not be lawful to use weapons that
create a smoke screen in a specific area in order to prevent the enemy
from being able to identify one's forces as they move through that
location?
process of treaty interpretation, "any subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation"
shall be considered.
48. Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 52(2).
49. The ICRC Commentary refers to such situation, and concludes that "there
can be a little doubt in such a case that the area must be considered as a military
objective and treated as such". See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 43, at 621; see also
Int'l L. Assoc. Study Grp. on the Conduct of Hostilities in the 21st Century, The
Conduct of Hostilities and International Humanitarian Law: Challenges of 21st
Century Warfare, 93 INT'L L. STUD. 322, 331 (2017) ("It should be noted that in the view
of a number of Western States a specific area of land may be a military objective if,
because of its location or other reasons specified in Article 52(2) API, its total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time offers
definite military advantage.").
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Admittedly, widening the definition of "military objectives" may
not be possible or reasonable in all cases, and in those cases, the
problem remains. At the same time, it does have the potential of
taking us further at least in certain, even if somewhat limited,
situations.
C. The Prohibition against Indiscriminate Attacks
API specifically prohibits "indiscriminate attacks," which
include, under Article 51(4)(a), attacks that are "not directed at a
specific military objective."5 0 It appears that the purpose of this
provision was to outlaw attacks intentionally directed at civilians or
civilian objects, as well as attacks in which commanders were
indifferent to what the attack would strike (or, to use API's phrasing
in Article 51(4)-"strike military objectives and civilians or civilian
objects without distinction").
It is widely accepted that the question of whether a specific
attack is indiscriminate may depend on factors such as the nature of
the target, the choice of weapons, and meteorological conditions.5 1
However, the question remains: How should this prohibition be
understood. and applied when the aim of the attack is not to "target"
anything, but to achieve a specific military benefit? (The purpose of
creating smoke screens is preventing the enemy from being able to
see one's forces; the purpose of breaching walls is to enable entry to a
building or movement between buildings; and so on.)
A possible solution, which must be further examined, is to
distinguish between targeting and other types of military operations.
Understanding the prohibition on "not directing an attack at a
specific military objective" as requiring each attack to be aimed at a
military objective makes sense when targeting is concerned. In cases
illustrated by the four practices surveyed above, in which there is no
"target" but simply a military purpose or benefit, the argument may
seem less convincing. Therefore, it seems necessary to further explore
the essential meaning of distinction in such cases.52
50. Additional Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 51(4)(a).
51. See, e.g., HPCR COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 94.
52. See, e.g., KNUT DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 309 (2003). Referring to the need to
"decide on the basis of the essential meaning of the principle of distinction," Dormann
writes, "[t]his principle presupposes the choice of targets and weapons in order to
achieve a particular objective that is lawful under humanitarian law and that respects
the difference between civilian persons and objects on the one hand, and combatants
and military targets on the other." Id. Such treatments of distinction are more nuanced
and may be better suited to address different kinds of military operations.
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D. The Applicability of Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations
Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations5 3 forbids the destruction
or seizure of an enemy's property, "unless such destruction or seizure
be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war."5 4 This Article
can certainly explain incidental and unintentional force, especially
concerning acts such as moving tanks through narrow streets, or
breaching tactics, when the act is imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war (although its wording refers only to property and so
it probably cannot justify harm to persons).
However, in order to make use of this argument, the relationship
between Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations and Article 52 of API
must be further explored. Can imperative military necessity justify
the destruction of an object which is not a "military objective" under
Article 52 of API, or would that be considered an indiscriminate
attack under API? Do both Articles regulate the same types of
activities, or is it possible to draw a distinction between the two?55 If
so, what is the dividing line? If not, what do we do in the event of a
conflict between the two Articles?5 6 These are only some of the
questions which must be considered.
53. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to
Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 23(g), Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
54. Id. art 23(g).
55. See, e.g., Nobuo Hayashi, Requirements of Military Necessity in
International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J.
39, 110-14 (2010) ("[D]estroying property and attacking property are two conceptually
distinct acts . . . Property destruction is militarily necessary only if it is required for the
attainment of a military purpose . . . In other words, military necessity justifies the
property's destruction, whereas the property's status as a military objective justifies
attacks being directed against it. The acts of destroying property and attacking
property are conceptually distinct from each other because the notions of military
necessity and military objectives are conceptually distinct from each other.").
56. On one hand, one might argue that in accordance with the principle of lex
posterior derogat priori, which is expressed in Article 59 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, if both articles might be relevant and there is a conflict between
them, the latter article must prevail. However, an alternative view still sees Article
23(g) as a valid justification for destruction of civilian property, even in cases where the
very same objects may not be attacked under Article 52 of Additional Protocol I.
Henderson, for example, argues that "[T]argeting is not the only lawful basis for
destruction of civilian property. For example, Article 53 GCIV and Article 23(g) HIVR
provide alternative legal bases for destruction of civilian property." See IAN
HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING: MILITARY OBJECTIVES,
PROPORTIONALITY AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK UNDER ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I 57
(2009).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Since Urban Operations are becoming increasingly common in
contemporary armed conflicts, it is essential to better understand the
legal challenges they raise. One such legal challenge, which this
Article focuses on, has to do with the application of the principle of
distinction. Four common practices employed in Urban Operations-
masking, firing warning shots, breaching structures, and
maneuvering with heavy machinery-especially challenge our
understanding of distinction, which has been shaped for decades
against the backdrop of targeting. These practices are all
longstanding, universal, and essential for achieving the military
mission, but it appears difficult to reconcile them with a targeting-
based interpretation of distinction: they are not necessarily directed
at military objectives or at anything at all. In light of the sheer
universality of these tactics on the one hand, and the undisputedly
customary nature of the principle of distinction on the other hand, it
is important that we seriously assess our understanding as to the
exact way the principle of distinction needs to be applied during
ground operations.
In this regard, this Article has proposed four avenues for further
consideration: (1) improving our understanding of the notion of
"attacks"; (2) rethinking the scope of "military objective";
(3) reassessing the exact scope of the prohibition on "indiscriminate
attacks," especially when the attack in question is not part of a
targeting operation; and (4) revisiting Article 23(g) of the Hague
Regulations as well as resolving its relationship with Articles 51(4)
and 52 of API.
Commitment to the principle of distinction and to the prohibition
against indiscriminate attacks is not in question. Distinction is a
cardinal norm of the LOAC, and any consideration of it must be done
in light of its importance and unchallenged status in customary
international law. At the same time, the prevalent understanding of
distinction has proved unsatisfactory in non-targeting contexts. It is
possible that no single solution or analysis exists which provide
answers to every possible scenario. It is nevertheless crucial to
further discuss these issues as Urban Operations resurge on the
battlefield, capture a higher place on the agenda of the international
community, and force us once more to verify that our interpretation of
the law is sufficiently nuanced to cope with what virtually all
militaries have been doing for centuries.
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